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1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the District Court's Opinion on Appeal affirming the Magistrate 
Court's decisions regarding the distribution of property and debt in a divorce action. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS / STATEMENT OF FACTS 
PlaintiffIRespondent Chris Dunagan (hereafter "Dunagan") and DefendantIAppellant Kelly 
Dunagan (hereafter "Kircher") were married on May 27,2000. The parties separated in 2005 and 
an interlocutory divorce was entered on March 21, 2006. A trial was conducted before the 
Honorable Magistrate Judge Randall W. Robinson on June 20,2006, regarding the distribution of 
property and debt. On July 17, 2006, Judge Robinson issued his Memorandum Opinion and 
Decision. On August 25,2006, an Order to Amend Decree of Divorce was entered. Kircher filed 
an appeal with the District Court in this case on October 5,2006, and Dunagan filed a cross appeal 
on October 12, 2006. On July 27, 2007, the Honorable District Court Judge John R. Stegner 
affirmed the Magistrate Court's decisions regarding the issues that Kircher appealed. 
Prior to marriage, Kircher operated a business called the Krystal Caf6. On July 24,2000, the 
parties acquired the real property on which the Krystal Caf6 was located (hereafter "Krystal Caf6 real 
property"). Of the $90,000 purchase price, $80,000 was financed through a joint bank loan. Both 
parties were placed on the title to the Krystal Caf6 real property and shortly after the purchase of the 
Krystal Caf6 real property, part of said real property was sold as the Krystal Caf6 did not occupy the 
entire building. At trial the parties agreed that the Krystal Caf6 real property was owned by both 
parties as community property and that the Krystal Caf6 real property and the debt should be 
assigned to Kircher, however conflicting testiino~~y was offered regarding the value of the Krystal 
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Cafe real property, After hearing testimony regarding the value of the Krystal Cafe real property 
from both sides, the Magistrate Court held that the ICrystal Cafe real property was worth $236,500. 
(R. p. 36-40.) 
Prior to marriage, Kircher owned a residential home (hereafter "marital home") that the 
parties lived in throughout the duration of the marriage. Said marital home was subject to a debt 
when the parties where married. During the duration of the marriage, the marital home was 
refinanced on two occasions. Before the first refinance, Kircher executed a Quitclaim Deed 
transferring her interest in the marital home to Kelly Dunagan (now Kircher) and Chris Dunagan, 
wife and husband. Both parties were signatories on the two marital home refinances. 
At trial, Kircher, to support her position that she should receive an unequal distribution of 
community property, sought to introduce testimony that the parties had an oral premarital agreement 
that each party would keep their finances separate. Kircher attempted to introduce testimony that 
she would not have executed the Quitclaim Deed had she known it would give Dunagan an interest 
in the marital home. Dunagan objected to this testimony because it would violate the parole 
evidence rule. While the Magistrate Court sustained the objection it allowed Kircher to make an 
offer of proof. This offer of proof included statements that Kircher made all payments on the home, 
all tax payments, all insurance payments, and all utility payments from her earnings. The Magistrate 
Court ultimately rejected Kircher's offer of proof because it concluded the testimony violated the 
parole evidence rule, treated the entire value of the home as an asset of the community, and assigned 
the home and debt associated with the marital home to Kircher. (R. p. 44-47.) 
Pertinent to this appeal is that during the parties marriage, Dunagan gave Kircher $500 on 
two occasions. Additionally, inNovember of 2003, $20,000 from the second refinance ofthe marital 
home went to the payment of debt on a 32 foot travel trailer owned by Dunagan. 
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After divisioil of property and debt, the Magistrate Court found that Dunagan was entitled 
to an equalization payment of $108,500. The Magistrate Court granted Kircher sixty (60) days in 
which to make the payment and ordered that if Kircher timely made such payment that Dunagan 
would be required to sign over and release to Kircher all interest in the ICyrstal Caf6 real property. 
The Magistrate Court further ordered that if ICircher did not make the payment then the Krystal Caf6 
real property would be put up for sale in a commercially reasonable manner because there was no 
other property available to pay Dunagan his equalization payment. (R. p. 5 1 .) 
On July 25,2006, Kircher filed a motion requesting clarification of the decree. Among other 
issues for clarification, Kircher requested "That in the event the net proceeds of the Krystal Caf6 do 
not equal the $196,905.36 equity contemplated by the Court, that the Court clarify the division of 
such net proceeds." A telephonic hearing was held and regarding this issue the Magistrate Court 
held: 
Fifth, the Defendant requests clarification of the division of the net proceeds should 
they not equal the equity contemplated by the Court. At the argument, the Defendant 
requested that the amount of equalization vary according to the actual amount that 
the property sells for. The Defendant's proposal has appeal as it gives both the 
Defendant and the Plaintiff an equal stake in the sale. Despite such appeal, I deny the 
Defendant's request. 
The value of the equalization payment is fixed at the time of the Decree based upon 
the fair market value of the property at the time of the divorce. Brinkmeyer v. 
Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 600, 21 P.3d 918 (2001). As noted by the Supreme 
Court, "Any community asset may change in value after the division of the 
community. This is not a reason to modify the division." Ross v. Ross, 11 7 Idaho 
548, 554, 789 P.2d 1139 (1990). The Plaintiff should not be peilalized by the 
Defendant's actions while controlling use of the building or by the vagaries of the 
market. By fixing the equalization payment, this Court is removed from becoming 
intimately involved with the Plaintiffs actions or inactions in controlling the building 
since the date the value was established. Also, the Defendant has alternatives to 
selling the Caf6 such as selling her own home andlor by loans. 
The Defendant argues she believes the business to be only worth $1 50,000.00 and so 
the Plaintiff will receive a windfall in obtaining a disproportionate value from the 
sale of the building. The Defendant at the trial failed to offer any evidence to support 
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her subjective belief as to the value of the building other than anecdotal stories about 
two local properties that had not sold quickly. The appraiser's value was adopted, 
a value which the appraiser said he would pay for the property. 
(R. p. 57-58.) 
Subsequently Kircher filed an appeal with the District Court raising the following issues: (1) 
whether the court made a mistake of law in ruling that evidence of the oral premarital agreement did 
not constitute a compelling circumstance for ordering an unequal disposition of the community 
property; (2) whether the court abused its discretion by ruling that the circumstances surrounding the 
marital home were not a compelling reason to order an unequal disposition of the community 
property; (3) whether the court abused its discretion in the disposition of the Krystal Cafk real 
property; and (4) whether the court achieved "substantial equality" in the disposition of the 
community property. 
On appeal, the District Court held that the Magistrate Court did not err as a matter of law in 
failing to consider the purported oral premarital agreement between the parties. (R. p. 73.) The 
District Court concluded that to be enforceable, premarital agreements must be in writing and that 
in light of the great weight of Idaho authority, no part performance exception exists. (R, p. 74.) 
With regards to whether or not the Magistrate Court abused its discretion by ruling that the 
circumstances surrounding the marital home were not a compelling reason to order an unequal 
disposition of the community property, the District Court affirmed the Magistrate Court's ruling. 
In reaching this decision, the District Court concluded that the Magistrate Court did not abuse its 
discretion in rejecting Kircher's testimony relating to the Quitclaim Deed, that Kircher failed to 
explain how evidence rejected because of the parole evidence rule would become admissible when 
offered for a different purpose, and that Kircher failed to explain her hardship in the context of I.C. 
§ 32-712, whose purpose is, in part, to set guidelines and boundaries for the Magiskate Court to 
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follow in malting the "threshold decision" between equal and unequal division of community 
property. (R. p. 75-76.) The District Court found that the Magistrate Court's decision to exclude 
evidence regarding the transmutation of the marital home was within its discretion, consistent with 
applicable legal standards, reached through the exercise of reason, and should not be set aside. (R. 
p 76.) 
Concerning the disposition of the Pirystal Cafe5 real property, the District Court held that the 
Magistrate Court's order awarding the IGystal Caf6 real property to Kircher if she makes the 
equalization payment within six months proper. (R. p. 77.) The District Court noted that Kirclier's 
real objection is to the value established for the real property by the Magistrate Court. Id 
Furthermore the District Court held that the Magistrate Court did exercise its discretion with regards 
to basing the equalization payment on the fair market value rather than the sale of the Krystal Caf6 
real property. (R. p. 78-79.) The District Court pointed out that Kircher's argument that the 
Magistrate Court felt bound to base the equalization payment on the market value assumed that 
Kircher would sell the building. (R. p. 78.) The District Court stated that the amended decree 
suggests the Magistrate Court exercised his discretion in favor of finality and chose to determine the 
value of the real property at the time of trial rather than becoming intimately involved with Kircher's 
actions, and that this decision was within the Magistrate Court's discretion, consistent with 
applicable legal standards and reached through the exercise of reason. (R. p. 79.) 
Finally the District Court concluded that there was substantial evidence that the Magistrate 
Court arrived at a substantially equal division ofthe community property. (R. p. 79-80.) 
RESPONDENT'S BFUEF 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
PARTIES PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE APPELLANT'S 
CLAIM OF AN ALLEGED ORAL PREMARITAL AGREEMENT 
AS A COMPELLING REASON TO ORDER AN UNEQUAL 
DISPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY? 
2. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MARITAL HOME AS 
A COMPELLING REASON TO ORDER AN UNEQUAL 
DISPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY? 
3. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN THE MANNER THE SALES 
PROCEEDS OF THE ICRYSTAL CAFEREAL PROPERTY WERE 





On a preliminary note, it must be pointed out that the practical effect of Kircher's first two 
issues on appeal is to argue that compelling reasons exist justifying an unequal division of 
community property in her favor based on otherwise unsound legal positions. The frrst issue is an 
attempt to characterize an invalid oral prenuptial agreement as a compelling reason for her to be 
awarded an unequal proportion of community property. The second issue is an attempt to 
collaterally attack a valid Quitclaim Deed that she executed transmuting the marital residence from 
separate to community. A transmutation that she is barred from setting aside because of the par01 
evidence rule, by claiming that the circumstances surrounding the marital residence constitute a 
compelling reason for her to be awarded an unequal proportion of community property. In other 
words, the first issue on appeal is an attempt by Kircher to circumvent Idaho statutory law and case 
law which requires that a prenuptial agreement be in writing. The second issue on appeal is an 
attempt by Kircher to circumvent that the legal effect of a valid transmutation of property from 
separate property to cominunity property. Basically Kircher is attempting to resuscitate her unsou~ld 
legal positions by claiming that these positions constitute compelling reasons for her to be awarded 
an unequal portion of community property. 
A. THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
PARTIES PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF AN 
ALLEGED ORAL ORAL PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AS A COMPELLING REASON 
TO ORDER AN UNEQUAL DISPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY. 
Unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise, the court in a divorce action is required 
to make a substantially equal division in value, considering debts ofthe community property between 
the spouses. Larson v. Larson, 139 Idaho 970,971-72,88 P.3d 1210,121 1-12 (2004). Thethreshold 
choice between substantial equality and an unequal but equitable division is co~nrnitted to the 
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discretion of the trial court, guided by statutory and case law. Bailey v. Bailey, 107 Idaho 324,327, 
689 P.2d 216, 219 (Ct. App. 1984). In reviewing an exercise of discretion, the court conducts a 
multi-tiered inquiry: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason. Chandler v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246,249,32 P.3d 140,143 (2001). 
I.C. 5 32-712(1)(b) sets forth factors that a magistrate court should consider in determining 
whether or not a division of community proper should be equal. In pertinent, these factors include: 
(1) Duration of the marriage; 
(2) Any antenuptial agreement ofthe parties; provided, however, that the court shall have 
no authority to amend or rescind any such agreement; 
(3) The age, health, occupation, amount and source of income, vocational skills, 
employability, and liabilities of each spouse; 
(4) The needs of each spouse; 
(5) Whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance; 
(6) The present and potential earning capability of each party: and 
(7) Retirement benefits, including, but not limited to, social security, civil service, 
military and railroad retirement benefits. 
I.C. 3 32-712(1)(b). 
1. The oral prenuptial agreement is not a valid antenuptial agreement. 
On appeal, Kircher claims that the Magistrate Court erred by failing to consider the parties' 
oral premarital agreement as a compelling reason to order an unequal disposition of community 
property in favor of Kircher. Icircher claims that this oral premarital agreement should be considered 
an antenuptial agreement for purposes of I.C. 3 32-712(1)(b). Because it has been unequivocally 
established by statutes and interpreted in case law that Idaho does not recognize oral prenuptial 
agreements, the Magistrate Court's decision that the oral prenuptial agreement does not constitute 
a compelling circumstance for an unequal disposition of the community property in favor of Kircher 
must be affirmed. 
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I.C. 5 32-917 specifically states that: "All contracts for marriage settlements must be in 
writing, and executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as coilveyances of land are 
required to be executed and acknowledged or proved." The Idaho Supreme Court has emphasized 
the importance of full compliance with Idaho Code 5 32-917 before an agreement is recognized: 
One of the major purposes for requiring life-changing documents to be written and 
executed is to impress upon the parties the importance of the legal consequences of 
the documeilt. For example, prenuptial agreements and wills must be written, signed, 
executed, and aclu~owledged. See LC. $ 32-922; I.C. 5 15-2-502. Dividing the 
properly of a community that may have lasted for decades has consequences at least 
as important as distributing the assets of the deceased. Indeed, the process of drafting 
an agreement often shows the parties that they omitted major issues or made hasty 
assumptions while negotiating. In addition, the requirement of writing and execution 
substantiates that the parties actually did come to a meeting of the minds in a vitally 
important area. 
See Stevens v. Stevens, 135 Idaho 224,229,16 P.3d 900,905 (2000); see also Pike v. Pike, 139 Idaho 
406,80 P.3d 342 (Ct. App. 2003) (Because any agreement regarding the divisioil of the retirement 
accounts is not in writing, it is unenforceable by either party.) 
Kircher's position is that the Magistrate erred in not considering the parties' oral prenuptial 
agreement to lteep their finances and debts separate as a compelling reason to order an unequal 
disposition of community property in favor of Kircher. This oral agreement fails to comply with the 
mandatory provisions of I.C. 5 32-917 and consistent with the Idaho Code and Idaho case law, is 
not enforceable as a valid prenuptial agreement and it is not an antenuptial agreement as 
contemplated by I.C. 5 32-712(1)(b). While written prenuptial agreements of parties could be 
considered a compelling reason for an unequal divisioil of cominunity property, interpreting I.C. 5 
32-712(1)(b) to allow oral prenuptial agreements to constitute a compelling reason for an unequal 
division of community property in effect destroys the basis for I.C. 3 32-917. If oral prenuptial 
agreements can constitute a compelling reason for an unequal division of community property there 
would he no need to have the agreements in writing rendering LC. 5 32-917 meaningless. Thus the 
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Magistrate Court did not err in failing to consider the parties' oral prenuptial agreement as a 
compelling reason to order anunequal disposition of the community property and its decision should 
be affirmed. 
2. There has been no partial oerformance of the oral orenuptial agreement because the 
parties failed to follow the terms of the agreement and modified the agreement. 
Kircher is asking this Court to recognize an exception to the requirement of I.C. § 32-91 7 that 
all contracts for marriage settlements must be in writing based on the doctrine of partial performance. 
Regardless of whether or not in some circumstances courts have found that partial performance of 
a oral contract alleviates the need for the contract to be in writing, the fact is that Idaho has never 
recognized such an exception in the context in which Kircher is asserting. Such a holding flies in 
the face of the statutory framework of the Idaho Code and is contrary to judicial interpretations of 
the Idaho Code. 
While Kircher has discussed the facts and holdings in Hull v. Hall, 222 Cal.App.3d 578 
(Cal.App. 4 Dist., 1990) and DewBerry v. George, 62 P.3d 525 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2003) in great 
detail, neither one of these cases deserve any consideration in this matter. Partial performance is a 
defense to a statute of frauds violation. According to Hull, a "substantial change of position in 
reliance on an oral agreement will estop reliance on the statute." 222 Cal.App.3d at 585. Relief 
because of the partial or full performance of the contract is usually granted in equity on the ground 
that the party who has so performed has been induced by the other party to irretrievably change his 
position and that to refuse relief according to the terms of the contract would otherwise amount to 
a haud upon his rights. Id. at 586. In this case, Kircher did not change her position whatsoever 
based on this oral prenuptial agreement and thus there is no equitable basis to enforce partial 
performance. 
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In DewBerry, the basis for the application of partial performance was that the oral agreement 
required each party's income and property to be treated as separate property and the court found 
strong evidence that the parities meticulously accounted for and handled their individual incomes 
as separate property. 62 P1.3d at 530. In our case, the parties had a purported oral prenuptial 
agreement to keep their finances and debts separate. However, the parties failed to so in this case. 
Dunagan gave Kircher $500 on two occasions - clearly contrary to the oral prenuptial agreement. 
Furthermore, and more significantly, in November of 2003, $20,000 from the second refinance of 
the marital home went to the payment of debt on a 32 foot travel trailerowned by Dunagan - again 
clearly contrary to the oral prenuptial agreement. Kircher and Dnnagan did not keep their finances 
and debts separate, contrary to the oral prenuptial agreement, and thus there can be no partial 
performance of the agreement. 
More importantly than the fact that Kircher did not change her position in reliance of the 
agreement, or that the parties did not follow the terms of their agreement, is the fact that the oral 
prenuptial agreement to keep their finances and debts separate was modified by the Quitclaim Deed 
executed by Kircher. The Quitclaim Deed transmuted the marital residence into community property 
after the oral prenuptial agreement was entered into. The fact that after the marital home had been 
refinanced a second time during marriage that a portion of the funds were used to pay the separate 
debt of Dunagan establishes beyond doubt that the parties intended to modify and abandon the 
agreement. 
Kircher is attempting to circumvent well established Idaho law by claiming that a oral 
prenuptial agreement, which is not enforceable in Idaho, constitutes a compelling reason for her to 
receive an unequal proportion of the community property. While in some instances, compelling 
reasons do exist which would justify anunequal division of community property, I.C. 3 32-712(l)(b) 
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should not be interpreted to assist a party who otherwise has an unsound legal position. Holding that 
an oral premarital agreement as a matter of law constitutes a compelling reason for an unequal 
division of community property destroys the requirement of 1.C. 5 32-917 that all contracts for 
marriage settlements must be in writing. 
B. THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MARITAL HOME A COMPELLING 
REASON TO ORDER AN UNEQUAL DISPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY. 
ICircher's next contention is that the Magistrate Court erred by not co~lsidering the 
circumstances surrounding the marital home as a compelling reason to order an unequal disposition 
of community property in favor of Kircher. Similar to Kircher's contention regarding the parties oral 
agreement, this position contradicts the provisions of the Idaho Code and the judicial interpretations 
of the Idaho Code. 
The Quitclaim deed executed by Kircher on July 13,200 1, transmuted the marital home from 
separate to community property. This transmutation complied with the statutory requirements of the 
Idaho Code. The Magistrate Courl properly held that the entire value of the marital home should be 
treated as an asset of the community. 
While Icircher appears to accept the Magistrate Court's holding that the marital home should 
be treated as an asset of the community, Kircher adopts the position that the circumstances 
surrounding the marital home constitute a compelling reason for the Magistrate Court to make an 
unequal division of community property between the parties. 
As set forth above, unless there were compelling reasons to do otherwise, the Magistrate 
Court in this divorce action was required to make a substantially equal division of community 
property. The threshold choice between substantial equality and an unequal but equitable division 
is committed to the discretion of the trial court, guided by statutory and case law. Bailey, 107 Idaho 
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at 327, 689 P.2d at 219. In reviewing an exercise of discretion, the court conducts a multi-tiered 
inquiry: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 
court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. Chandler, 136 Idaho at 249, 32 P.3d at 143. 
I.C. 5 32-712(1)(b) sets forth factors that a magistrate court should consider in determining 
whether or not a divisioil of community proper should be equal. The purpose of I.C. 32-712, is in 
part, to set guidelines and boundaries for the Magistrate Court to follow in malcing the "threshold 
decision" between equal and unequal division of community property. See Donndelinger v. 
Donndelinger, 107 Idaho 431,435,690 P.2d 366,370 (Ct. App. 1984). 
The Magistrate Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Kircher's testimony relating 
to the Quitclaim Deed based on the parole evidence rule, nor as stated above, does Icircher appear 
to challenge that holding. However, Kircher claims that the circumstances surrounding the marital 
home should constitute a compelling reason for an unequal division of community property in her 
favor and the Magistrate erred by not considering these circumstances as a compelling reason. As 
the District Court pointed out, Kircher fails to explain how the evidence that Kircher submitted in 
her offer ofproof, which was rejected because of the parole evidence rule, would become admissible 
when offered for the different purpose of constituting a compelling need. Dunagan is under the 
impression that the offer of proof was made to challenge the validity of the Quitclaim Deed, not as 
a compelling need under I.C. 32-712(1)(b). The Magistrate Court stated that "besides the oral 
agreement, the only fact argued was the duration of the marriage." (R. p. 35.) 
In this case the Magistrate Court was required to make a substantially equal division unless 
there existed compelling reasons to do otherwise. The Magistrate Court recognized that the factors 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -13- 
listed in I.C. 3 32-712(1)(b) are not all-inclusive. (R. p. 35.) The Magistrate Court observed that 
besides the oral premarital agreement, the only other compelling factor that was argued was duration 
of the marriage. While the Magistrate Court stated that "generally, to show compelling need, 
hardship is the most important factor" this statement is merely an observation of cases that it has 
examined and does not stand for the proposition that the Magistrate felt that it could not find, in its 
discretion, a compelling need unless a hardship existed. 
The Magistrate Court's decision to exclude evidence regarding the transmutation of the 
marital home was within its discretion, consistent with applicable legal standards, reached through 
the exercise of reason, and should not be set aside. Furthermore the offer of proof was not even 
argued as a compelling need. Similar to Kircher's position that the oral premarital agreement, which 
is unenforceable, should be considered a compelling reason for an unequal division of community 
property in her favor, Kircher is merely trying to collaterally attack the valid Quitclaim Deed. The 
Quitclaim Deed which is a valid antenuptial agreement. In light of the validity of the Quitclaim 
Deed, a holding that the circumstances surrounding the marital home constitute a compelling need 
for an unequal division of comlnunity property in favor of Kircher would in effect be amending or 
rescinding the valid antenuptial agreement, which is contrary to the provisions of I.C. 5 32-712(1)(b) 
(2) (any antenuptial agreement of the parties; provided, however, that the court shall have no 
authority to amend or rescind any such agreement). 
C. THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE MANNER THE SALES 
PROCEEDS OF THE KRYSTAL CAFE REAL PROPERTY WERE TO BE 
DISTRIBUTED IN EQUALIZING THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITY ASSETS. 
The disposition of community property is left to the discretion of the trial court, and unless 
there is evidence in the record to show an abuse of that discretion, the award of the trial court will 
not be disturbed. Chandler, 136 Idaho at 249, 32 P.3d at 143 (citations omitted). 
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Encompassed in the disposition of community property is the determination of the value of 
that property. Id. at 249, 32 P.3d at 143 (citations omitted). Court's have held that in "divorce 
proceedings the determination of the value of community property is within the discretion of the trial 
court and will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by substantial competent evidence." Id 
at 249,32 P.3d at 143 (citations omitted). The value of the equalization payment is fixed at the time 
of the Decree based upon the fair lnarlcet value ofthe property at the time of the divorce. Brinkrneyer 
v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho at 600,21 P.3d 918. "Any community asset may change in value after the 
division of the community. This is not a reason to modify the division." Ross v. Ross, 117 Idaho 
at 554,789 P.2d 1139. 
When there is conflicting evidence, it is well established that the trial court judge is the 
arbiter of the evidence, and of the credibility and weight to be given the evidence. Desfosses v. 
Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354, at 357, 815 P.2d 1094, at 1097 (Ct. App. 1991). The trier of fact is in a 
unique position to make determinations of credibility and to discern the import of the testimony. 
Miller v. Mangus, 126 Idaho 876, at 880,893 P.2d 823, at 827 (Ct. App. 1995). If the trial court's 
factual findings are supported by substantial, though conflicting, evidence in the record, they must 
be accepted on appeal. Jensen v. Jensen, 124 Idaho 162, at 164, 857 P.2d 641, at 643 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
1. There is no substance to Kircher's argument that the Magistrate Court failed to 
com~lv  with I.C. 6 32-713. 
Kircher assei-ts that the Magistrate Court erred in failing to make a disposition in accordance 
with I.C. 3 32-713. Kircher's position is that, pursuant to Idaho Code 5 32-713, the Magistrate 
Court had the option oE 1) awarding the Krystal Caf6 real property to one party with a corresponding 
award of value of property to the other: 2) ordering the Krystal Caf6 real property sold and dividing 
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the proceeds equally between the party; or 3) ordering the Krystal Caf6 real property partitioned 
between the parties (Larsen v. Larsen, 139 Idaho 970,88 P.3d 1210 (2004)) and that the Magistrate 
Court failed to exercise any of these options. However, in appropriate circumstances a fourth option 
is available. The trial court can also award property to one spouse and order the other to make 
payments over a reasonable period of time to equalize the division. Id. at 972,SS P.3d at 1212. 
While the Magistrate Court did not order that the Krystal Caf6 real property be partitioned, 
as noted by Kircher, his order is consistent with the other options available under Idaho Code § 32- 
713. The Magistrate Court awarded the Krystal Caf6 real property and the debt to Kircher and 
awarded Dunagan a correspoilding value ofproperty, as evidenced by the equalization payment. The 
fact that Dunagan does not have to transfer his interest to Kircher until after she makes the 
equalization payment does not conflict with the requirements of Idaho Code § 32-713. In fact it's 
consistent with the fourth option set out in Larson, and it merely creates a security interest in favor 
of Dunagan until the equalization payment is made. Based on the order Kircher has sixty days to 
malce the payment, and then if she does Dunagan's security interest is extinguished. If she fails to 
make the payment then the Krystal Caf6 real property is sold and both parties receive the proceeds 
equally. Kircher cites no case law supporting her interpretation and to invalidate the order on this 
ground flies in the face of common sense and common practice. As a practical matter, the inability 
to protect the non-receiving spouse from having the receiving spouse take the property and dispose 
of it, or keep it, without paying the equalization payment would dictate that the trial court either 
order the sale of any property, or the partition of any property, if one party owed another party an 
equalization payment without ever giving a party a chance to keep the property and pay off the 
equalization payment. Such a result cannot be what the drafters of our statutes contemplated. 
Likewise Kircher seems to misinterpret the effect of selling the Krystal Caf6 real property 
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and dividing the proceeds between the parties. The debt allocation is already built into the 
equalization payment and has already been fairly accounted to both parties through other awards. 
Kircher has already been credited with $19,750 of other community property. 
Thus contray to Kircher's contention, the Magistrate Court did not abuse its discretion and 
its order is consistent with the provisions of Idaho Code $ 32-713 and should be affirmed. 
2. The Magistrate Court did not abuse its discretion bv failing to base the equalization 
payment on the actual sales price. 
Any argument to the contrary not only is illogical but misreads the Magistrate Court's order. 
First of all, Kircher's argument presumes that the building is going to be sold, which is not the case. 
The building is only to be sold pursuant to the Magistrate Court's order if Kircher cannot pay the 
equalization payment according to the Magistrate Court's terms. If you accept Kircher's position 
then it would be impossible for the Magistrate Court to calculate an equalization payment if Kircher 
retains the Krystal Caf6 real property - which is what both parties agreed to and what the Magistrate 
Court ordered. The Krystal Caf6 real property is only to be sold if the equalization payment cannot 
be made. In its order, the Magistrate Court contemplated that Kircher would keep the Krystal Caf6 
real property if she makes the equalization payment. As such, it would be impossible to derive the 
equalization payment based on a sale that would never occur. 
Secondly, Kircher claims that this error is based on the Magistrate Court's mistaken belief 
that it did not have the discretion to enter such an order (basing the equalization payment on the 
actual sale price). This contelltion is apparently based on the Magistrate Court's statement that "The 
Defendant's proposal has appeal as it gives both the Defendant and the Plaintiff an equal stake in the 
sale. Despite such appeal, I deny Defendant's request." A full reading of the Order to Amend 
Decree ofDivorce does not support this contention. While the Magistrate Court never came out and 
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said "this decision is discretionary" it is obvious that it treated this decision as discretionary. First 
of all, it did not say "Defendant's proposal has appeal and I would like to grant it but it is not in my 
discretion to do so." If the Magistrate Court felt so strongly about it, but felt bound, then it certainly 
would have justified its failure to adopt this position had it considered it to be outside of its hands. 
Secondly, if it felt bound to deny this position, the Magistrate Court would not have justified its 
decision by stating that Dunagan should not be penalized by Kircher's ac t io~~s  or by the vagaries of 
the market, or that this way the court would not have to be intimately involved, nor would the 
Magistrate Court have mentioned that Kircher has several alternative to selling the Krystal Caf6 real 
property. 
In summary, the Magistrate Court did not abuse its discretion by failing to base the 
equalization payment on the actual sale price. As set forth above, it would be impossible to set the 
equalization payment without an actual sale and an actual sale was not mandated by the Magistrate 
Court. Secondly, a complete reading of the Magistrate Court's order shows that it viewed this issue 
as discretionary and authored its opinion as such. Furthermore Kircher tries to illustrate scenarios 
which showcase the problems ofthe Magistrate Court's decision. However, such illustrations should 
be given no weight. Said illustrations base the sale of Krystal Caf6 real property at $150,000 - the 
amount Kircher unsuccessfully attempted to get the Magistrate Court to establish as the fair market 
value for the Krystal Caf6 real property. As set forth in its order, the Magistrate Court heard the 
evidence and concluded that $236,500 was the fair market value of the Krystal Caf6 real property. 
No other sale price should be contemplated. The sale of any real estate has some associated risk. 
Some property sells for less than fair market value while some property sells for more than fair 
market value. The overall trend in real property is that it appreciates. The point being that a court 
can never eliminate the risk that the fair market value it assigns to property will not match the actual 
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sale price and this risk cannot be considered grounds to overturn the Magistrate Court's decision in 
this case. Thus Dunagan respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Magistrate Court's order on 
this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Dunagan respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Magistrate 
Court's holdings regarding the issues in this appeal. 
DATED This 18th day of March, 2008. 
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